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ABSTRACT

For over a decade, copyright infringement using peer-to-peer ("P2P") file sharing has plagued the
content industries. Response came in the form of massive lawsuits against file sharers and the use
of technologies including digital rights management and technical protection measures. However,
illegal P2P file sharing is still rampant. Increasingly, internet service providers ("ISPs") have begun
to monitor network traffic with deep packet inspection. Under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
("DMCA"), ISPs are usually only responsible for their own direct copyright infringing acts. To
mitigate potential liability, some ISPs have agreed to partner with copyright owners to serve
warnings to subscribers before the ISP suspends a subscriber's internet access. While these
agreements may result in greater copyright enforcement and a corresponding decrease in illegal file
sharing, ISPs acting as "copyright cops" raises many legal and social concerns.
The legislation on ISP liability in mainland China and Hong Kong mirrors section 512 of the DMCA.
Considering that ISPs in mainland China are state-owned while those in Hong Kong are not, this
article examines whether it is desirable to impose a duty to filter packet content for illegal file
sharing on ISPs in mainland China and Hong Kong, and whether other technologies such as the
notice-and-notice procedure and the joint use of digital fingerprinting and digital watermarking may
more efficiently reduce illegal file sharing.
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MANAGING PEER-TO-PEER TRAFFIC IN MAINLAND CHINA AND HONG KONG
KE STEVEN WAN*

INTRODUCTION

For over a decade, copyright infringement using peer-to-peer ("P2P") file sharing
has plagued the content industries (the music, motion picture, and more recently the
gaming industries).' P2P file sharing allows individual users to swap files such as
music, movies, and games stored on their computers. 2 The content industry
responded in a number of ways, from massive lawsuits against both consumers and
commercial file sharers to the use of technologies such as digital rights management
("DRM") and technical protection measure ("TPM") that restrict the ability of the
consumer to use copyrighted works in ways that are legal but unlicensed. 3 The
content industry has experienced both judicial and legislative victories in the United
States, from the court holdings in the Napster4 and Grokster5 cases to the enactment
by the United States Congress of the Higher Education Opportunity Act ("HEOA"). 6
However, none of these formal legal approaches are totally satisfactory because
illegal P2P file sharing is still rampant.7 Increasingly, internet service providers
*C Ke Steven Wan 2012. Assistant Professor, City University of Hong Kong School of Law.
S.J.D., LL.M., University of Pennsylvania Law School. The author would also like to thank the
John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law for its excellent editorial work.
1See Ben Depoorter et al., Copyright Backlash, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 1251, 1259 (2011) (stating
that due to an increase in the number of online copyright infringements, the entertainment industry
redirected its focus from targeting developers of software applications that 'facilitated' online
copyright infringements to individual users of file-sharing technologies).
2 See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 919-20 (2005)
(stating that software products "allow computer users to share electronic files through peer-to-peer
networks, so called because users' computers communicate directly with each other, not through
central servers"). See also id. at 920 (stating that peer-to-peer networks "can be used to share any
type of digital file, they have prominently been employed ... in sharing copyrighted music and video
files without authorization.").
3See Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Youtube, UGC, and Digital Music: Competing Business and
CulturalModels in the Internet Age, 104 Nw. U. L. REV. 431, 443 (2010) ("The recording industry has
dealt with the digital threat in a number of ways, including using digital rights management (DRM)
and technological protection measures (TPM) to control uses of content . . . intended to prevent
unauthorized use of digital works and play a role in DRM systems.").
4 See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1011 (9th Cir. 2001) (affirming a
preliminary injunction that enjoined Napster "from engaging in, or facilitating others in copying,
downloading, uploading, transmitting, or distributing plaintiffs' copyrighted musical compositions
and sound recordings, protected by either federal or state law, without express permission of the
rights owner.").
5See Metro-Goldwyn, 545 U.S. at 941 (holding that one who distributes a device with the object
of promoting its use tu infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative stp
taken to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties).
6 Higher Education Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 110-3 15, 122 Stat. 3078 (2008).
SSee Cameron Stracher, Behind The Headlines: Your Local Library May Have a New NameGoogle, 8 PRIVACY & DATA SECURITY L.J. 1, 2 (2006) (stating that the law will struggle to keep up
with new technology, and that the music industry may have won the battles in Napster and
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8
("ISPs") have begun to monitor network traffic with deep packet inspection ("DPI").
DPI is able to inspect "every byte of every packet that passes through the DPI device.
That means packet headers, types of applications, and [unless encrypted] actual
packet content." 9 The use of DPI by ISPs may result in ISPs losing their safe harbor
immunity for the copyright infringing acts of their subscribers. 10 Under the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA"), ISPs are usually only responsible for their own
direct copyright infringing acts, and are immune from third-party liability under
theories of contributory or vicarious liability for the subscribers' acts of direct
copyright infringement." To mitigate potential liability, some ISPs have agreed to
partner with copyright owners to serve warnings to subscribers before the ISP
suspends a subscriber's internet access under a graduated response system. 1 2 While
these agreements may result in greater copyright enforcement and a corresponding
decrease in illegal file sharing, ISPs acting as "copyright cops" on behalf of copyright
owners raises many legal and social concerns. 13
The legislation on ISP liability in mainland China and Hong Kong mirrors
section 512 of the DMCA. 14 This article will examine whether it is desirable to

Grokster, but they may still be losing the war; lawsuits may be ineffective in fighting the tide of
innovation).
See also Stan J. Liebowitz, File Sharing: Creative Destruction or Just Plain
Destruction?, 49 J.L. & ECON. 1, 13 (2006) (stating that the RIAA lawsuits caused a temporary
diminution of file-sharing activity, but this activity has since increased by noting that "[flile-sharing
activity appeared to be higher in 2005 than it had been prior to the lawsuits, although there is no
complete agreement on this claim.").
8Andrea N. Person, Behavioral Advertisement Regulation: How the Negative Perception of
Deep Packet Inspection Technology May Be Limiting the Online Experience, 62 FED. COMM. L.J. 435,
438 (2010) ("Deep Packet Inspection technology provides Internet service providers (ISPs) with the
ability to collect all Internet communications made by a consumer. Depending on how the
technology is deployed, it may monitor[], analyze[], and potentially manipulate [] Internet traffic.")
(internal quotations omitted).
9Id. at 438. "When DPI technology is deployed, it first collects the information that consumers
view online. To do this, DPI collects packets. On the internet, packets combine to create online
communications such as Web browsing, e[-]mail, [V]oice-over-I[nternet] P[rotocol] (VoIP) phone
calls, peer-to-peer ([P2P]) file transfers, [and] online gaming, among others." Id.
10See Peter K. Yu, The Graduated Response, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1373, 1392 (2010) ("If ISPs were
to fully investigate the potential infringing activities, the costs of such investigation could be
prohibitive. They might also lose the safe harbor protection the current law extends to them.").
11See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2006). See also Hendrickson v. Amazon.com, Inc., 298 F. Supp. 2d 914,
916 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (stating that the safe harbor affirmative defense against a claim of vicarious
copyright infringement may apply to an ISP if it can establish: (1) that it had no actual knowledge
of the infringement, (2) that it did not have a direct financial benefit from the infringement; and (3)
that after notification it did not remove the infringing material).
12See Yu, supra note 10, at 1374.
[T]he graduated response system provides an alternative enforcement
mechanism, through which ISPs can take a wide variety of actions after giving
users two warnings about their potentially illegal online file-sharing activities.
These actions include, among others, suspension and termination of service,
capping of bandwidth, and blocking of sites, portals, and protocols.
Id.
13See also id. at 1391-92 (outlining the drawbacks of a graduated response system).
14Ke Steven Wan, Internet Service Providers' Vicarious Liability Versus Regulation of
Copyright Infringement in China, 2011 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y, 375, 379 (2011) ("The Chinese
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impose a duty to filter packet content for illegal file sharing on ISPs in mainland
China and Hong Kong, and whether other technologies such as the notice -and-notice
procedure and the joint use of digital fingerprinting and digital watermarking may
more efficiently reduce illegal file sharing. Digital watermarking and digital
fingerprinting are different yet complementary technologies. 15 A digital watermark
is data embedded into a digital file that identifies the copyright owner of the file, the
purchaser or downloader of the file, and any other aspects related to the use of the
file. 16 Digital fingerprinting does not embed data into the file. Instead, it analyzes
the content of the file, extracts significant characteristic components ("fingerprints")
and then seeks a match in a database based on those fingerprints. 17
This article offers two considerations for the analysis of P2P file sharing. First,
this article explores whether a modified system could have a significant impact in
mainland China. P2P infringement is rampant in China.18 Currently, Chinese
courts and agencies have focused their copyright infringement enforcement efforts on
hosting services and search engine services; courts have yet to heavily combat
individual consumer-subscriber copyright infringement in China.19 There are
equitable concerns about imposing direct liability on subscribers.
It might be
inappropriate to design a legal system where only a small fraction of wrongdoers are
penalized and suffer extremely harsh penalties. 20 Extreme civil or criminal penalties

government adopted legislation that provides ISPs with "safe harbors" from damages caused by the
misconduct of their subscribers.").
15Hiram Melendez-Juarbe, DRM Interoperability, 15 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 181, 193-94
(2009); Lauren G. Gallo, The (Im)Possibility of "StandardTechnical Measures" for UGC Websites, 34
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 283, 285 n.16 (2011) ("Major right holders such as Viacom, Inc. argue that
watermarking should supplement fingerprinting technology, enabling right holders to automatically
identify their content, and negating the need for a notice-and-takedown system
altogether .... [h]owever, watermarking is not currently implemented on as wide a scale as
fingerprinting."); Lindsee Gendron, A Safer Harbor, 36 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 619, 633 (2010) ("This
new technology will focus on watermarking, but will supplement it with audio fingerprinting to
catch anything that watermarking may miss.").
16Matt Williams, Congress Should Amend the Copyright Act to Protect Transactional
Watermarks, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1367, 1381 (2008).
17 See id. at 1370 n.15.
18 INT'L INTELL. PROP. ALLIANCE, 2011 SPECIAL 301 REPORT ON COPYRIGHT PROTECTION AND
ENFORCEMENT 58 (Feb. 15, 2011) [hereinafter IIPA REPORT:
PRC], available at

http://www.iipa.com/rbc/2011/2011SPEC301PRC.pdf.
19 See Trudy S. Martin, Vicarious and Contributory Liability for Internet Host Providers:
Combating Copyright Infringement in the United States, Russia, and China, 27 WIS. INT'L L.J. 363,
399 (2009).
Chinese courts recognize that, if internet service providers (ISPs) infringe on
copyrights through internet use, or if they use the internet to help others carry
out an infringing activity .. ,. the courts [can] use the copyright law and may make
a finding of collective responsibility for the infringement.
Under Chinese
copyright law, ISPs that know of and fail to abate copyright infringing activity
will be subject to liability alongside the infringing user.
Id. at 399 (internal quotation marks omitted).
20 See Doug Lichtman & Eric Posner, Holding Internet Service Providers Accountable, 14 SUP.
CT. ECON. REV. 221, 234 n.36 (2006); Douglas Lichtman & William Landes, Indirect Liability for
Copyright Infringement: An Economic Perspective, 16 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 395, 408 (2003); see also
Susan Freiwald, Comparative Institutional Analysis in Cyberspace: The Case of Intermediary
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may distort legitimate uses of the Internet and have a chilling effect on the
development of technology and new business models. 21
However, major ISPs in mainland China are state-owned. 22 Even if they are
shareholding companies, a court may still be reluctant to make the ISPs pay
damages because of the association with the government. 23 The local government
may reach an agreement with the state-owned ISPs that the local government will
compensate copyright owners, and the state-owned ISPs will compensate the local
government by investing more in developing the area. The local government has a
strong incentive to lower the amount of compensation and instruct the courts what
actions to take. 24 In South Korea, government agencies, rather than ISPs, determine
the disconnection issues. 25 This article examines whether the Korean graduated
response system is applicable to China.
Second, a major goal of this article is to influence the legislation in Hong Kong.
Almost half (44.5 percent) of the Hong Kong residents supported a graduated
response system to prevent online copyright infringement, while only 23.7 percent
believed that a graduated response system would not be an effective approach. 26 The
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region's ("HKSAR") "Proposals" paper rejected
the statutory graduated response system as a way to deal with repeat infringers, but
offered no alternative. 27 To solve the P2P filesharing issue, a so-called notice-andnotice procedure was introduced. 28 This procedure dictates that, an ISP must pass
the copyright owner's notice to its subscribers. 29 The notice-and-notice procedure
ensures that the court makes the final decision regarding copyright infringement
issues but has received scant attention as an alternative to the graduated response
system.30

This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I reviews the P2P cases in mainland
China and examines the desirability of the Korean graduated response system. Part
Liability for Defamation, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 569, 630 (2001) ("The consistency problem plagues
all court determinations but takes on special significance for cyberspace rules.").
21See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1193,
1206 (1985) ("If there is a risk either of accidental violation of the criminal law or of legal error, an
expected penalty will induce innocent people to forgo socially desirable activities at the borderline of
criminal activity.").
22 See Jongpil Chung, Comparing Online Activities in China and South Korea, 48 ASIAN
SURVEY 727, 731-32 (2008) (stating that the Chinese government exerts rigorous internet
censorship and is able to filter content and block access to Internet sites in order to control what
people read, see, and hear).
23 See Wan, supra note 14, at 397-98 (noting the close link between the internet and
government in China).
24 Id. at 399.
25 See Yu, supra note 10, at 748 (stating that South Korea has adopted the graduated response
system).
26Eamonn Fode, Hong Kong Residents in Favour of Graduated Response, MUSIC WEEK (May 6,
2010) http://www.musicweek.com/story.asp?storyCode= 1041052&sectioncode= 1.
27 INT'L INTELL. PROP. ALLIANCE, 2011 SPECIAL 301 REPORT ON COPYRIGHT PROTECTION AND
ENFORCEMENT 390 (Feb. 18, 2010) [hereinafter IIPA REPORT:
HONG KONG], available at

http://www.iipa.com/rbc/2010/2010SPEC301HONGKONG.pdf.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Id.
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II reviews the P2P cases in Hong Kong and analyzes the desirability of the noticeand-notice procedure. Part III concludes.

I. P2P FILE SHARING IN MAINLAND CHINA

Deterrence theory requires lawmakers to hold wrongdoers liable for
infringement. 31 Direct liability may fail to act as a deterrent when wrongdoing is
expensive for the victim to detect or for the government to prosecute. 32 The
conditions of the Internet make it very difficult to penalize individual wrongdoers. 33
The relative anonymity of Internet subscribers makes the detection of wrongdoers
very costly. 34 Even if caught, infringers often turn out to be judgment-proof
individuals, who lack sufficient assets to pay damages. 35 Some people might argue
that criminal liability could be a substitute. 36 However, it may not be cost-effective to
impose criminal liability, especially imprisonment, on infringers. 37 The cost of
31See Assaf Hamdani, Who's Liable for Cyberwrongs?, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 901, 910 (2002)

("Deterrence theory seeks to impose on wrongdoers the social cost of their wrongdoing."); see also
Robin Andrews, Copyright Infringement and the Internet: An Economic Analysis of Crime, 11 B.U.
J. SCI. & TECH. L. 256, 261-62 (2005) ("Deterrence theory suggests that criminal law should be
designed to prevent crime ex ante, instead of merely seeking to punish ex post, under the
assumption that potential criminals will choose their course of action based on the expected
consequences.").
32 See Hamdani, supra note 31, at 910.
33 See id. at 910-11 (stating that infringers are often teenagers or college students who lack the
means to pay damages, which makes it "impossible to impose [judgments] upon copyright-infringing
Internet users to full optimal penalties dictated by deterrence considerations.").
34 See id. at 910.
35 See Ian C. Ballon, Pinning the Blame in Cyberspace: Towards a Coherent Theory for
Imposing Vicarious Copyright, Trademark and Tort Liability for Conduct Occurring over the
Internet, 18 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 729, 734-35 (1996) (noting that college students, who may

not have the resources to pay large judgments, were sued by the government in many of the most
notorious Internet criminal prosecutions); Michael B. Rutner, The ASCAP Licensing Model and the
Internet: A Potential Solution to High-Tech Copyright Infringement, 39 B.C. L. REV. 1061, 1070
(noting that most copyright infringers are individuals who "do not have enough assets to make legal
action worthwhile"). See, e.g., United States v. LaMacchia, 871 F. Supp. 535 (D. Mass. 1994)
(involving an M.I.T. student); United States v. Morris, 928 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502
U.S. 817 (1991) (involving a Cornell graduate student); United States v. Baker, 890 F. Supp. 1375
(E.D. Mich. 1995) (involving a University of Michigan student).
36 See Andrews, supra note 31, at 257 ("As policymakers increasingly see piracy as a criminal
act, they naturally look to criminal theories for assistance in their counterefforts.").
37 See Aaron Rappaport, Litigation over Prison Medical Services, 7 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY
L.J. 261, 282 (2010) ("[I]n many cases we have overstated the benefits of prison, while ignoring its
enormous fiscal and human costs."); see also Andrews, supra note 31, at 262-63 (discussing the
economic costs of crime and law enforcement); Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An
Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 179-80 (1968) (discussing resource allocation and how
much punishment should be used to enforce different kinds of legslation). It is also unfair to impose
harsher punishment on innocent violation of copyright law than medical malpractice. See Geraldine
Szott Moohr, The Crime of Copyright Infringement: An Inquiry Based on Morality, Harm, and
Criminal Theory, 83 B.U. L. REV. 731, 747-52 (2003) (discussing the rationale for treating conduct
as criminal); LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW
TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 199-202 (Penguin Press 2004). There are other
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imprisonment includes the prosecutorial cost, the wages of guards, buildings, and
food.38 Unlike in the case of civil damages, nobody gets what the prisoner loses.39
Besides, extreme criminal penalties may distort legitimate use of the internet and
have a chilling effect on technology development. 40 Hence, it is sometimes impossible
to impose direct liability on wrongdoers. 41 Expanding liability to third parties is a
solution to deal with the under-deterrence of internet subscribers. 42 In the context of
online copyright infringement, manufacturers of computers, developers of internet
browsers, and makers of modems are all candidates for the imposition of third-party
liability. 43 Lawmakers should only expand liability, however, to those parties who
are in a good position to deter misconduct cost-effectively. 44
One commentator defines the cheapest cost avoider as the party who can avoid
the accident at the lowest overall cost. 45 Guido Calabresi and Jon Hirschoff define
the cheapest cost avoider as the party who "is in the best position to make the costbenefit analysis between accident costs and accident avoidance costs and to act on
that decision once it is made." 46 The party who is in the best position to make the
cost-benefit analysis is not necessarily the one that acts upon it.47 The cheapest cost
avoider test has been traditionally applied to product manufacturers. 48 Judges only
equitable concerns as well. A legal system where only a small fraction of wrongdoers are penalized
and suffer extremely harsh penalties is unjust. See Lichtman & Posner, supra note 20, at 234 n.36;
see also Lichtman & Landes, supra note 20, at 408 (discussing different forms of indirect liability);
Freiwald, supra note 20, at 596-99 (discussing intermediary liability in defamation cases).
38Becker, supra note 37, at 180; Sara Sun Beale, Solutions: Is Corporate Criminal Liability
Unique?, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1503, 1512 (2007).
39 See also Posner, supra note 21, at 1201 (noting that tort law, with compensatory and
punitive damages, is insufficient to address criminal offenses, which explains the development of
separate criminal proceedings seeking to restrain liberty).
40Id. at 1206 ("If there is a risk either of accidental violation of the criminal law or of legal
error, an expected penalty will induce innocent people to forgo socially desirable activities at the
borderline of criminal activity.").
41See Hamdani, supra note 31, at 910-11.
42See Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93
YALE L.J. 857, 888-96 (1984) (noting that third-party liability is necessary to address the failure of
direct liability).
43 See Alfred C. Yen, Internet Service Provider Liability for Subscriber Copyright Infringement,
Enterprise Liability, and the FirstAmendment, 88 GEO. L.J. 1833, 1864 (2000) (noting that nearly all
information technology providers could be held liable).
44 See Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement
Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53, 100-01 (1986) (proposing a four-part test for the desirability of
gatekeeper liability).
45 Stephen G. Gilles, Negligence, Strict Liability, and the Cheapest Cost-Avoider, 78 VA. L. REV.
1291, 1307-08 (1992).
46Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L. J.
1055, 1060 (1970); see also Richard W. Wright, The Principles of Product Liability, 26 REV. LITIG.
1067, 1099 (2007) (analyzing why product manufacturers are the cheapest cost avoider).
47 Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra note 46, at 1060 n. 19.
48 See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 136
(Yale Univ. 1970) (applying the cheapest cost avoider test to car manufacturers); see also Thomas C.
Galligan, Jr., Strict Liability in Action: The Truncated Learned Hand Formula, 52 LA. L. REV. 323,
344 (1991); David G. Owen, Rethinking the Policies of Strict Product Liability, 33 VAND. L. REV. 681,
711-12 (1980) (emphasizing a willingness to assume manufacturers are to blame for product
accidents).
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need to decide the cheapest cost avoider between the injurer and the victim. 49 In
online copyright infringement, however, courts need to determine the cheapest cost
avoider among the copyright owner, the direct infringer, and the ISP.5 0
If copyright owners can determine the cheapest cost avoider, should courts let
them "bribe" the ISP-the cheapest cost avoider-to prevent infringement?
"Whenever accident costs exceed the cheapest cost avoider's prevention costs, [the
party bearing] accident costs will bargain with the cheapest cost avoider to prevent
the accident."5 1 Regardless of the initial allocation of liability, market forces will
ensure that the cheapest cost avoider bears the prevention costs in the absence of
transaction costs. 52 Legal rules do not affect the efficient outcome in a perfect market
without transaction costs because voluntary transactions of rational individuals will
make the best use of resources. 53
"[G]overnment intervention is considered
economically undesirable" in a perfect market. 54
In the case of copyright
infringement, if copyright owners have a right to enjoin the third-party, they can sell
the right.5 5 If the third-party has the right to sell products or services with impunity,
it can sell the right. 56 The party who values the right to infringe more will buy it
from the other if necessary.5 7
Transaction costs, however, may disrupt the
negotiation and transaction between parties.5 8
The market may incur two types of transaction costs. First, the search for the
cheapest cost avoider may incur transaction costs; 59 second, the cheapest cost avoider

49 Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra note 46, at 1060-61.
50See Brandon Brown, Fortifying the Safe Harbors: Reevaluating the DMCA in a Web 2.0
World, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 437, 463 (2008) (noting that Congress took the concept of cost
avoidance into consideration while debating the DMCA).
51See Richard D. Cunningham, Apportionment Between Partmakers and Assemblers in Strict
Liability, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 544, 549-50 (1982); see also Guido Calabresi, Transaction Costs,
Resource Allocation and Liability Rules, 11 J.L. & ECON. 67, 67 (1968) (analyzing the Coase
Theorem and arguing that it is as equally valid in the long term as it is in the short term); see
generally Harold Demsetz, The Exchange and Enforcement of Property Rights, 7 J.L. & ECON. 11,
12-26 (1964) (discussing the Coase Theorem and the role of governments and markets in economic
life); Harold Demsetz, When Does the Rule of Liability Matter?, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 13, 13-28 (1972)
(discussing the Coase Theorem and analyzing how legal liabilities will affect the allocation of
resources).
52See generally R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 42-44 (1960)
(articulating what is currently known as the Coase Theorem).
53 Marianne M. Jennings & Stephen Happel, The Post-Enron Era for Stakeholder Theory: A
New Look at Corporate Governance and the Coase Theorem, 54 MERCER L. REV. 873, 910-11 (2003);
Mark MacCarthy, What Payment Intermediaries Are Doing About Online Liability and Why It
Matters, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1037, 1047-51 (2010); See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW
AND ECONOMICS, 82-96 (Pearson/Addison Wesley, 2d ed. 1997); Coase, supra note 52, at 5-6; Alfred
C. Yen, A PreliminaryEconomic Analysis of Napster: Internet Technology, Copyright Liability, and
the Possibility of Coasean Bargaining,26 U. DAYTON L. REV. 247, 264-65 (2001).
54Yen, supra note 53, at 258-59.
BS
Cf. Jennings & Happel, supra note 53, at 911 (applying the Coase Theorem to copyright law).
56 Id.

57 Yen, supra note 53, at 264-65.
58 Id.

SD
See CALABRESI, supra note 48, at 136-38 (explaining the affect that transaction costs have
on the search for the cheapest cost avoider).
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may charge a premium in exchange for bearing the prevention costs. 60 Depending on
the parties' bargaining power, the premium can be as high as their differences in
prevention costs. 61 Due to ISPs' market power, they are highly likely to charge a
significant premium. 62 The failure to reach an enforcement agreement after years of
negotiations between copyright owners and ISPs suggests that the premiums
charged by ISPs exceed the amount that copyright owners are willing to pay. 63
Because the transaction costs may be higher than the administrative costs of judicial
allocation of accident costs, it is more desirable for lawmakers to impose liability on
the ISP. 64
The economic literature regarding primary wrongdoing assumes that it is
desirable to make wrongdoers "internalize the social cost of their wrongdoing." 65 The
reason is that, even if they cannot prevent wrongdoing, they can reduce their activity
level. 66 For third parties, however, the scale of their activity "should not be adjusted
to the social cost of wrongdoing." 67
The goal of third-party liability is to deter
wrongdoing rather than scale down the activity level. 68 Commentators argue that
deterrence, rather than fairness, should be the justification for vicarious liability. 69 A
commentator supports indirect liability:
[I]ndirect liability need not be conceived merely as a second-best solution to
a discrete set of problems with direct liability. When some easily
identifiable third party is better positioned to monitor and control the
behavior of the primary wrongdoer than a court or other government
60 See Cunningham, supra note 51, at 549-51; Harold Demsetz, Wealth Distributionand the
Ownership of Rights, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 223, 224-27 (1972) (explaining that insurance companies

charge premiums in exchange for taking on risk).
61 Cunningham, supra note 51, at 550 ("Depending on the parties' relative bargaining
positions, th[e] premium can range anywhere from just above zero to just below the difference
between their prevention costs . . . .").
62 Wan, supra note 14, at 385.

Id
Id. (explaining that in "many situations" the costs of judicial intervention are less than the
costs associated with "private attempts to find the cheapest cost avoider.").
63

64

65 Hamdani, supra note 31, at 912.
66

Id.

67 See id.; see also Alan 0. Sykes, The Boundaries of Vicarious Liability: An Economic Analysis
of the Scope of Employment Rule and Related Legal Doctrines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 563, 573 (1988).

By measuring those incremental costs with reference to the social costs that
would otherwise arise if the resources used by the enterprise were unemployed, a
resulting competitive equilibrium will tend to generate an efficient allocation of
resources among alternative enterprises and alternative (nonenterprise) uses for
the resources (such as leisure).

Id.

68

Hamdani, supra note 31, at 912.
69 Gary T. Schwartz, The Hidden and Fundamental Issue of Employer Vicarious Liability, 69 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1739, 1754, 1763-64 (1996); Ke Steven Wan, Monopolistic Gatekeepers' Vicarious
Liability For Copyright Infringement, 23 REGENT U. L. REV. 65, 87-92 (2010) (exploring the

rationales for vicarious liability such as deterrence and corrective justice). There are equity
counterarguments, however. Some argue that ISPs should not be held vicariously liable merely
because they are in a good position to prevent online copyright infringement. Alfred C. Yen, Third
Party Copyright Liability After Grokster, 91 MINN. L. REV. 184, 213 (2006).
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regulator, indirect liability will be more efficient than even perfectly
functioning direct liability. 70
Indirect liability is desirable when the third-party can detect and deter
misconduct at low costs.71 Commentators list examples of precautions an ISP can
take. An ISP can detect subscribers' suspicious patterns of Internet use, such as "a
continuous stream of communications from a home user or the repeated appearance
of identical computer code attached to a large number of outgoing email messages." 72
An ISP can also keep a record of subscribers' activities for a period of time so that
infringers can be discovered. 73 In addition, an ISP can alert other ISPs or customers
about suspicious changes in traffic patterns so that they can locate the source of the
threat or avoid the harm. 74 Because ISPs can control the content on their networks
and potentially deter misconduct at acceptable costs, this article will assume that
ISP liability is desirable.
P2P infringement is rampant in China. 75
Currently, Chinese courts and
agencies have focused their copyright infringement enforcement efforts on hosting
services and search engine services; courts have yet to heavily combat individual
consumer-subscriber copyright infringement in China. Shanghai Push Sound Music
& Entm't. Co. v. Kuro76 was the first case to hold a P2P operator liable for users'
copyright infringement in China.77 Similar to Napster, Kuro allowed users to share
MP3 files at twenty Chinese yuan ($2.56 USD) per month.7
It maintained a music
classification and ranking list on its website, although the contents of the MP3 files
were kept in users' computers. 79 The court found that Kuro prepared the music list
so that users could have easy access to the music. 80 In addition, the software showed
"nobody is sharing the music at the moment" when users tried to download certain
music files.81 Thus, the music list was not compiled utilizing the users' public
folders. 82 The court held that Kuro induced the unauthorized sharing of music and
should be found jointly liable for user's copyright infringement. 83 Kuro was ordered

70 Daryl

J. Levinson, Aimster and Optimal Targeting, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1148, 1154 (2007).
supra note 37, at 236-37.

71 Lichtman & Posner,
72 Id. at 237.
73Id.

74Id. at 238.
75 IIPA REPORT: PRC, supra note 18, at 61.
76Shanghai Push Sound Music & Entm't. Co., Ltd. v. Beijing FashioNow Co., (2005) Er Zhong
Min Chu Zi No. 13739 (Beijing No. 2 Intermediate Court, Dec. 19, 2006).
77Id.; Jessie Ho, Kuro Case Sets P2P Precedent in China, BILLBOARD (Jan. 3, 2007),
http://www.billboard.com/news/kuro-case-sets-p2p-precedent-in-china1003527087.story#/news/kuro-case-sets-p2p-precedent-in-china-1003527087.story; Qian Wong, The
New Right of Communication Through the InformationNetwork in the People's Republic of China, in
COPYRIGHT LAW, DIGITAL CONTENT AND THE INTERNET IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC 15 (Sydney Univ. Press
2008).

78Ho, supra note 77;

Wong, supra note 77, at 14-15.

TB
Shanghai Push Sound Music & Entm't.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id.
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to pay 200,000 Chinese yuan in damages. 84 In fact, Kuro was not the first case
involving a P2P operator in China. 85 The Guangzhou Intermediate Court held a P2P
operator liable under direct liability in 2006.86 The court in Kuro was the first to find
a P2P operator's secondary liability for copyright infringement.8 7
Beijing Ciwen Movie & TV Prod. Co., Ltd. v. Beijing Zhenglejia Tech. Co., Ltd.88
similarly held the P2P operator Zhenglejia liable for infringing the copyright of
movies. 89 Ciwen alleged that Zhenglejia induced the sharing of the movie "Seven
Swords" via its P2P software. 90 Zhenglejia set up a column called "Popular Movie
Download-Top 30" on www.pp365.com, where "Seven Swords" was on the top of its
list. 91 The court held that Zhenglejia's inducement could be found in the "Popular
Movie Download-Top 30" column, where users could have easy access to the movie
rather than search for the key words "Seven Swords." 92
In Guangzhou Zoke Culture Dev. Co. v. Guangzhou Shulian Software Dev. Co., 93
Shulian set up a platform to allow users to transmit files among themselves through
the POCO software. 94 POCO was used to share photos and information on fine
dining as well as online communication, in addition to the dissemination of movies. 95
Thus, developing POCO itself does not constitute copyright infringement. 96 However,
Shulian established a program called "Movie Exchange Column" to enable users to
provide download links and upload movie posters and plot descriptions. 97 The court
ruled that Shulian induced the unauthorized download of movies and was ordered to
pay 50,000 Chinese yuan in damages, although it put copyright notices on its
website.98

While the graduated response system is increasingly popular, 99 the reality is
that the war on P2P is essentially about the control over content uses rather than the

Id.
Id.
86 Beijing Ciwen Studio Inc. v. Guangzhou Shulian Software Tech. Inc. (Guangzhou
Intermediate Court).
87 Shanghai Push Sound Music & Entm't.
88 Beijing Ciwen Movie & TV Prod. Co., v. Beijing Zhenglejia Tech. Co.. (MirV
21822).
89 Id.
84
85

90

Id.

91 Id.
92

Id.

93Id.

94 Guangzhou Zoke Culture Dev. Co. vs. Guangzhou Shulian Software Dev. Co., (2006)

P

95 Id.
96 Id.
98

Id.

9 Greg Sandoval, Top ISPs Agree to Become Copyright Cops, CNET NEWS (July 17, 2011),
http://news~nt.com/8301-31001_3-20077492-261/top-ip-agr-to-become-copyrightcops/?tag=mncol;4n (noting that U.S. ISPs agreed to implement the graduated response system);
Adrian Strain & Alex Jacob, IFPI Publishes Digital Music Report 2011, IFPI (Jan. 20, 2011),
http://www.ifpi.org/content/sectionresources/dmr201%1.html (noting that France, South Korea, U.K.,
Ireland, Taiwan, Chile have adopted the graduated response system.); Yu, supra note 10, at 137677.
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goal of additional revenue. 100 The graduated response system fails to promote
copyright goals of stimulating creation because it will aggravate the misuse of the
notice-and-takedown procedure and strengthen the content industry's control over
consumer uses of content. 101 The notice-and-takedown procedure requires an ISP to
expeditiously remove or block access to infringing materials upon notices from
copyright owners. 102 In addition, Michael Geist notes that the cost of one notification
can be a minimum of $11.73 (for larger ISPs) to a maximum of $32.73 Canadian
dollars (for smaller ISPs). 1 03
This may place small ISPs at a competitive
disadvantage. 104 The U.K. government estimated that as much as 500 million
pounds would be spent on the graduated response system over the next ten years.105
In contrast, digital fingerprinting and digital watermarking enable conduit ISPs to
deter P2P infringement neutrally and cost-effectively, and should be given more
attention.106
Digital fingerprinting and digital watermarking enable ISPs to deter P2P
infringement without directly targeting and penalizing wrongdoers and may provide
promising insight into the P2P issue. 107 Moreover, unlike government sponsored
regulatory enforcement mechanisms, digital fingerprinting and digital watermarking
do not impose additional burdens on government bureaucracies and once
implemented by an ISP are automated and self-enforcing. 108 Network management
of illicit copyrighted content reduces congestion and avoids additional costs of
upgrading the infrastructure. 109 It is estimated that up to seventy percent of
In addition to France, similar laws and policies have been adopted, considered, or
rejected by Australia, Germany, Hong Kong, the Netherlands, New Zealand,
South Korea, Sweden, Taiwan, and the United Kingdom. Thus far, proposals for
the development of a graduated response system have been rejected by Germany,
Hong Kong, Spain, and Sweden as well as the European Parliament.
Id.
100Lital Helman, When Your Recording Agency Turns into an Agency Problem: The True
Nature of Peer-To-PeerDebate, 50 IDEA 49, 51 (2009).
101Yu, supra note 10, at 1390-1403.
102 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2006).
103PAUL CHWELOS, INTERNET SERVICE PROVIDERS REPORT 1 (Jan. 20, 2006).
104 Id
105 Id.
106Lindsee Gendron, A Safer Harbor, 36 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 619, 619 (2010) ("The competition
that already exists in this market makes the introduction of the filtering requirement economically
feasible.").
107David Kravets, DRM is Dead, but Watermarks Rise from Its Ashes, WIRED (Jan. 11, 2008),
http://www.wired.com/print/entertainment/music/news/2008/01/sony-music
("[W]atermarking is
likely to produce fresh, empirical data that copyright material is ping-ponging across peer-to-peer
sites - data the industry would use in its ongoing bid to tighten copyright controls, and to browbeat
internet service providers to implement large -scale copyright-filtering operations.").
108T.J. McIntyre & Colin Scott, Internet Filtering: Rhetoric, Legitimacy, Accountability and
Responsibility, in REGULATING TECHNOLOGIES 2 (R. Brownsword and K. Yeung eds., 2008) ("Once
the technology is developed and deployed flu further human intervention is reurd
unles and
until users find ways to circumvent the intended controls.").
109 GEORGE Ou, MANAGING BROADBAND NETWORKS: A POLICYMAKER'S GUIDE 7 (Internet Info.
Tech. & Innovation Found 2008), available at http://www.itif.org/files/NetworkManagement.pdf.
See Paul Ohm, The Rise and Fall of Invasive ISP Surveillance, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1417, 1425
(2009) (noting the effect of bandwidth increases on infrastructure).
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broadband bandwidth is consumed by music, movies, games, and similar
unproductive
downloads. 110
However, digital fingerprinting
and digital
watermarking may force ISPs to bear the filtering cost and increase the price of their
services, resulting in a potential change in subscribers' behavior.111 Of course, it is
possible that a decrease in illicit uses of an ISP's services may result in sufficient cost
savings that these savings will off-set the additional costs of monitoring web
traffic.112
Youku, China's leading video sharing website, is a pioneer in implementing the
digital fingerprinting technology to prevent copyright infringement. 1 1 3 In addition to
Youku's own copyright screening system, videos uploaded onto Youku will be
simultaneously checked against the VideoDNA Database ("VDDB") developed by
Vobile, a leading international provider of fingerprinting technology. 1 1 4 Vobile's
technology can "identify copyrighted content even in cases where uploaders have
deliberately tampered with the video or audio to reduce identifiability."1 1 5
Major ISPs in China are state-owned, however. 116 It is doubtful whether
copyright owners can receive adequate damages from state-owned ISPs. 117 For
example, China National Petroleum Corp ("CNOP") caused the huge oil spill in the
major northern Chinese port Dalian on July 16, 2010.118 After months of negotiation,
the local government reached an agreement with CNOP that the local government

110 MANAGING PEER-TO-PEER TRAFFIC WITH CISCO SERVICE CONTROL TECHNOLOGY,

CISCO

Sys.
1
(Feb.
2005),
available
at
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/prod/collateral/ps7045/ps6129/ps6133/ps6l5o/prod-white-paper0900aec
d8023500d.html.
111
Mehan Jayasuriya et al., Forcing The Net Through A Sieve: Why Copyright Filtering Is Not
A Viable Solution For U.S. ISPs, in BROADBAND & CABLE INDUSTRY LAW 2010, at 221, 232 (PLI
Pats., Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Prop. Course, Handbook Ser. No. 221, 2010), available at
WL, 993 PLI/Pat 221. ("The costs associated with filtering--most notably, the purchasing and
maintenance of filtering hardware and software--are likely to be passed on to consumers, decreasing
the affordability of broadband services.").
112 Yu, supra note 10, at 1376-77 ("Furthermore, while ISPs still have a strong interest in
increasing their market share, their economic bottom line, along with the high resource and
administrative costs and the concerns over network congestion, may eventually force them to take
action to boot some illegal file-sharers off their network.").
113 Youku Upgrades Fingerprinting System for Tougher Copyright Protection Measures, PR
NEWSWIRE
(Mar.
7,
2011),
http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/youku-upgradesfingerprinting-system-for-tougher-copyright-protection-measures- 117513508.html.
114 Id
115Id.

116Lyombe Eko et al., Google this: The Great Firewall of China, The It Wheel of India, Google
Inc., and Internet Regulation, 15 J. INTERNET L. 3, 4-5 (2011) ("Over the years, China has
established an Internet law regime that regulates the content and activities of Internet Service
Providers, Internet Content Providers, and Chinese citizens on the Net. The result is that the
Chinese government is the effective gateway to the Internet in its national territory.").
117 State owned ISPs remain deferential to regulatory and security authorities. See Jonathan
Ansfeld, Amendment Tightens Law on State Secrets in China, N.Y. TIMES, at A9 (Apr. 29, 2010)
("Many of China's communications and Internet service providers are already state-owned entities,
and they rarely defy orders to intercept content."); but see JAMES M. ZIMMERMAN, CHINA LAW
DESKBOOK: A LEGAL GUIDE FOR FOREIGN-INVESTED ENTERPRISES 670-72 (Am. Bar Ass'n 2005).
118 Michael Wines & Keith Bradsher, Workers Question China's Account of Oil Spill, N.Y.
TIMES, at GA (Aug. 4, 2010).

[11:548 2012]

Managing Peer-to-Peer Traffic in
Mainland China and Hong Kong

561

would compensate the victims and CNOP would compensate the local government by
investing more in the area. 119 The local government had a strong incentive to lower
the amount of compensation and instructed the court what they should do, as long as
CNOP's investment would boost the local GDP, which in turn would help local
officials' promotion chances. 120 The same might happen in a case involving stateowned ISPs such as China Telecom. If the local government mediates for the ISP, it
is unclear whether copyright owners can obtain adequate damages from the local
government.121 In the above P2P infringement cases, the amount of damages ranges
from 50,000 to 200,000 Chinese yuan. 122 If the amount is not significant enough, the
ISP may simply treat it as the licensing fee and infringe copyright again.
The Korean graduated response system might be an alternative solution for
mainland China. The Korean Copyright Commission1 23 ("KCC") and the Ministry of
Culture, Sports and Tourism1 24 ("MCST"), rather than an ISP, decide whether to
suspend a subscriber's internet access. 1 25 MCST is empowered to issue correction
orders to an ISP, requiring it to remove infringing content, issue warnings to the
subscriber or even suspend his account. 126 Before MCST takes any action, the matter
must be reviewed by the KCC, and the ISP and the subscriber may submit their
statements. 127 Once the MCST issue the order, the ISP must act in five to ten
days. 128 Otherwise, a fine up to ten million won (approximately $9000 USD) may be
imposed. 129 The email service of the suspended account, however, will not be

119See Chen Aizhu, China Dalian Oil Spill Cleaned 9 Days After the Accident, REUTERS (July
26, 2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/07/26/us-dalian-spill-idUSTRE66P18U20100726;
1
i
(July 26, 2011), http://ny.china.com.cn/2011-07/26/content 4359507 2.htm;
China's CNPC
'to Invest in City Hit by Oil Spill, PHYSORG (Jan. 4, 2011),
http://www.physorg.com/news/201 1-01-china-cnpc-invest-city-oil.html.
120 But see Prosecutors Looking at Dalian Oil Spill Case CHINA DAILY (Nov. 25, 2011),
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2011-11/25/content_14158840.htm.
121 Jeffrey W. Berkman, Intellectual Property Rights in the P.R.C.: Impediments to Protection
and the Need for the Rule of Law, 15 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 1, 20 (1996).
An obvious conflict of interest therefore arises when the local government is more
interested in protecting profitable, although illegitimate, local businesses than
expending resources to shut them down. Even the best intentions of local
departments may not be sufficient if they lack the financial resources and
personnel to initiate enforcement efforts.
Id.
122 Shanghai Push Sound Music and Entm't. Co. v. Kuro, (2005) i
VjJ4 137399;
Guangzhou Zoke Culture Dev. Co. vs. Guangzhou Shulian Software Dev. Co., (2006)f-+ R1(
)VJ
'*384 .
123 Jeojakkwonbeop [Korean Copyright Act], Act No. 9785, July 31, 2009, arts. 112, 133 (5.
Kor.).
124 Id. rtS. 112-2, 133.
125Id. art. 133.
126 Id. art. 133-2; Sun-Young Moon & Daeup Kim, The "Three Strikes" Policy in Korean
Copyright Act 2009: Safe or Out?, 6 WASH. J. L. TECH. & ARTS 171, 171 (2011).
127 Korean Copyright Act, art. 133-2. Moon & Kim, supra note 126, at 172.
128 Korean Copyright Act, art. 133-3(2).
129 Id. art. 142(2)(3).
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affected. 130 The suspended subscriber may also access the internet through other
ISPs.131

KCC is authorized to grant to an ISP self-regulating correction
recommendations, including removal of infringing content, issuance of warnings to
the subscriber and suspension of a repeat infringer's account. 1 32 KCC may request
MCST to issue coercive correction orders if the ISP fails to comply with the
recommendations. 133 The practice in the past two years indicated almost one
hundred percent compliance by ISPs. 1 34 Thirty-one subscribers' accounts have been
suspended for less than one month pursuant to KCC's recommendations. 1 35
The Korean approach might work in mainland China, where administrative
protection is parallel to judicial protection. 136
The National Copyright
Administration and the Copyright Administration at the local level have authority to
deter piracy. 137 Like Korea, lawmakers can authorize two agencies to determine the
issue of copyright infringement to prevent the abuse of power in mainland China.

II. P2P FILE SHARING IN HONG KONG
Almost half (44.5 percent) of the Hong Kong residents supported a graduated
response system to prevent online copyright infringement, while only 23.7 percent
believed that a graduated response system would not be an effective approach. 138
The HKSAR Administration's "Proposals" paper rejected the statutory graduated
response system as a way to deal with repeat infringers, but offered no alternative. 1 39
130Id. art. 133-2(2)(1).
131
132

Id.
Id.

133 Id.

art. 133-2(3).
134Facts and Figures on Copyright Three-Strike Rule in Korea, HEESOB'S IP BLOG (Oct. 24,
2010, 3:20 PM) http://hurips.blogspot.com.
135

Id.

Ke Steven Wan, Internet Service Providers' Vicarious Liability Versus Regulation of
Copyright Infringement in China, 2011 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 375, 399 (2011); See Lina Wang,
Intellectual Property Protection in China, 36 INT'L INFO. & LIBR. REV. 253, 258 (2004).
China has devoted much manpower, materials, and financial resources to
intellectual property protection and mobilized various institutions to carry out
acts of cracking down on counterfeiting and burglary copyright .... As a system,
intellectual property protection includes the legislative protection, administrative
protection, juridical protection, protection of collective managerial organization of
intellectual property, technical protection, and the self-relief of the intellectual
property owner. The protection in these six aspects is interpenetrated and
interworked, forming a stereoscopic line of defense of socially comprehensive
harnessing.
Id.
137See Wang, supra note 136, at 258.
138Eaomnn Forde, Hong Kong Residents in Favor of GraduatedResponse, MUSICWEEK (May 6,
2010), http://www.musicweek.com/story.asp?storyCode=1041052&sectioncode=1.
136

139 LEGISLATIVE
COUNCIL PANEL ON COMMERCE AND
INDUSTRY, PROPOSALS FOR
STRENGTHENING COPYRIGHT PROTECT IN THE DIGITAL ENVIRONMENT 5-6 (Nov. 2009), available at

http://www.cedb.gov.hk/citb/ehtml/pdf/consultation/PanelPaperDigitalEngFull.pdf;
REPORT: HONG KONG, supra note 27, at 389.
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[11:548 2012]

Managing Peer-to-Peer Traffic in
Mainland China and Hong Kong

563

To solve the P2P filesharing issue, a so-called notice-and-notice procedure was
introduced in a voluntary Code of Practice agreed by the content industry and
ISPs. 1 40 It provided the notice-and-notice procedure and the notice-and-takedown
procedure for ISPs to follow. 1 41 An ISP is advised to pass the copyright owner's notice
to its subscribers. 142 Despite the lack of penalties after a series of warnings, the
notice-and-notice procedure should be able to deter most infringers because of the
threat of lawsuits. 1 43
Copyright owners may intend to shift the cost of deterring egregious infringers
to ISPs through the graduated response system. 1 44 Under the notice-and-notice
procedure, the copyright owner will have to deter egregious infringers through
litigation and bear the litigation cost. 1 45 The notice-and-notice procedure may be
more expensive for copyright owners than the graduated response system, but the
former ensures that the court makes the final decision following due process. 146 In
terms of the time spent, it may take longer to disconnect an egregious infringer
140 HONG KONG COMMERCE

DIGITAL ENVIRONMENT,

& ECON. DEV. BUREAU, DRAFT:

COPYRIGHT PROTECTION IN THE

CODE OF PRACTICE FOR SERVICE PROVIDERS 6-9 (2009),

available at

http://www.cedb.gov.hk/citb/doc/en/DraftCode-ofPracticeEng-final.pdf.
141 Id.; Hong Kong Copyright (Amendment) Bill 2011, Div. IIIA, cl. 45, sec. 88B (2011)
(introducing safe harbor provisions, affording ISPs immunity for subscribers' copyright
infringement).
142 Id. at sec. 88D.
143See David Carnoy, Verizon Ends Service of Alleged Illegal Downloaders, CNET NEWS (Jan.
20, 2010), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-10437176-93.html ("[The Verizon representative] also
noted that ... issuing warning letters is proving to be effective."); Greg Sandoval, AT&T Exec: ISP
Will Never Terminate Service on RIAA's Word, CNET NEWS (Mar. 25, 2009), http://
news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-10204514-93.html ("[An AT&T vice president] said the notices worked.
The company saw very few repeat offenders."); Broder Kleinschmidt, An International Comparison
of ISP's Liabilities for Unlawful Third Party Content, 18 INT'L J.L. & INFO. TECH. 332, 351 (2010)
("The notice-and-notice regime in fact seems to be effective ... [eighty to ninety percent] of
complaints are resolved after the first notice and there are relatively few repeat complaints about
the same content and the same user as at least one of CAIP's larger members has found."); see
generally Michael Geist, The Effectiveness of Notice and Notice (Feb. 15, 2007),
http://www.michaelgeist.ca/content/view/1705/125/; but see IIPA REPORT: HONG KONG, supra note
27, at 390 (noting that the lack of penalties after a series of warnings will not deter repeat
infringers).
144See Yu, supra note 10, at 1382-83 (discussing how the graduated response system is more
cost effective than the traditional method of enforcing copyrights through litigation).
145 Id.
146Jason Rudkin-Binks & Stephanie Melbourne, The New "Three Strikes"Regime for Copyright
Enforcement in New Zealand-RequiringISPs to Step Up to the Fight, 20 ENT. L.R. 146, 149 (2009).
The primary advantage of this [notice-and-notice] procedure is that it leaves the
ISP as a mere go-between and places any legal decision making and
interpretation of copyright legislation rightly in the hands of the courts. The
removal of infringing material would only take place on judicial order after due
consideration of the various interests involved in the dispute. Secondly, it confines
the conflict between the copyright owner and the alleged infringer, leaving those
parties to bear the costs of any legal proceedings. Thirdly, instead of blocking
access to an entire website merely on allegations of copyright breach, it takes a
less aggressive approach by passing the complaint to the alleged offender, thus
not inhibiting freedom of expression.
Id.
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under the notice-and-notice procedure than under the graduated response system
because the disconnection issue will have to be decided by a court under the former
procedure. 147 Because the egregious infringer's misconduct is usually unambiguous,
the court may grant the copyright owner a preliminary injunction and develop
expedited procedure to hear the cases.
Cinepoly Records v. Hong Kong Broadband Network1 48 was the first lawsuit
brought by the music industry in Hong Kong concerning the disclosure of alleged P2P
infringers. 149 Twenty-two alleged infringers uploaded music files via the P2P
software WinMX. 150 When the plaintiff asked the ISPs to disclose the infringers'
identities, three of the four ISPs said that only a court order would allow them to
disclose the infringers' identities due to the ISPs' commitment under the Hong Kong
Personal Data Protection (Privacy) Ordinance. 15 1
The fourth ISP, i-Cable
Communications, said that they would appeal against the ruling even if the plaintiff
obtained a court order. 152 Unable to identify the anonymous alleged infringers, the
plaintiff requested a Norwich Pharmacal order to discover their identities. 1 53 Three
conditions must be met to issue a Norwich Pharmacal order: (1) "there must be some
serious tortious or wrongful activities;" 154 (2) "the applicant must bona fide believe
that the alleged wrongdoer is infringing their rights;" 155 and (3) "the innocent party
against whom disclosure is sought has become involved in these activities and
thereby facilitating them." 156 Because the third party facilitates the wrongdoing, it is
under a moral obligation to disclose the direct infringer's identity. 157
The ISPs refused to disclose the infringers' identities because of the Personal
Data Protection (Privacy) Ordinance ("PDPO"). 158 A number of exemptions in the
PDPO, however, allow the access to personal data, including the prevention of
"unlawful or seriously improper conduct". 1 59
The court held that copyright
infringement should fall within the meaning of unlawful conduct. 160 In addition, the
147See Michael Boardman, Digital Copyright Protection and Graduated Response: A Global
Perspective, 33 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 223, 253-54 (2011).
148 Cinepoly Records Co. v. Hong Kong Broadband Network Ltd, 1 H.K.L.R.D. 255 (HC (HK));
HKCFI84; HCMP002487/2005 (Jan. 26, 2006).
149 Id.
150 Id. at 260.
151 Id. at 271.
152 Id. at 275; Wan Ting Low, Tackling Online Copyright Infringement in Hong Kong, 17 ENT. L
REV. 122, 124 (2006).
153 Cinepoly Records Co, 1 H.K.L.R.D. at 255; Low, supra note 152, at 124; see Melody Yiu, A
New Prescription for Disclosure: Reformulating the Rules for the Norwich Order, 65 U.T. FAC. L.
REV. 41, 44-47 (2007); Peter Devonshire, Freezing Orders, DisappearingAssets and the Problem of
Enjoining Non-parties, 118 L.Q. REV. 124, 145 (2002).
154 See Jojo Mo, Cinepoly Records Co. v Hong Kong Broadband Network Ltd, 2009 E.I.P.R. 48,
48-49 (2009).
155 Id. at 49.
156 Id.
157 Yiu, supra note 153, at 60. When applying the mere witness rule, Lord Reid divided
witnesses into two categories: bystanders and facilitators. Id. at 48. Mere bystanders are immune
to discovery. Id.
158 Cinepoly Records, 1 H.K.L.R.D. at 258.
159 Personal Data Protection Ordinance, (1995) Cap. 486 § 58 (H.K.).
160 Cinepoly Records, 1 H.K.L.R.D. at 268.

[11:548 2012]

Managing Peer-to-Peer Traffic in
Mainland China and Hong Kong

565

court held that a Norwich Pharmacal order is an equitable relief and could not be a
breach of the duty of confidentiality in the subscribers' agreement. 1 61 Thus, the court
ordered the ISPs to disclose the names, addresses and identity card numbers of
twenty-two alleged infringers.162
Chan Nai Ming v. HKSAR 163 was the first case in the world to impose criminal
sanctions on a P2P infringer. 164 The defendant, Chan Nai Ming, shared three movies
using a P2P network. 1 65 The defendant argued that an infringing electronic copy
cannot be distributed without transferring its physical storage device to a recipient of
distribution.166 The court rejected his argument, holding that use of a physical
storage device was not an essential condition for the transfer or "distribution" of an
electronic copy. 1 67
Furthermore, there were no factual or legal reasons for
"distribution" of electronic copies to be confined to the physical transfer of storage
devices. 168 The court also found that '[d]istribution' in its ordinary meaning is
clearly capable of encompassing a process in which the distributor first takes
necessary steps to make the item available and the recipient then takes steps of his
own to obtain it."169 Here, the defendant took all the necessary steps to make the
movies available by keeping his computer connected to the Internet and continuing to
run the BitTorrent software to ensure that entire copies of the movies would be
transferred to the downloaders. 170 The use of an automated process does not make
the defendant a passive participant. 171 He was convicted and sentenced to three
months' imprisonment. 172

III. CONCLUSION
This article has examined how P2P file sharing greatly facilitates the
distribution of knowledge, yet brings new challenges to copyright law enforcement.
The battle against illegal P2P file sharing is likely to continue for some time due to
its unique structure and potential benefits. Copyright owners have sought to hold
the P2P software developer liable and introduced the graduated response system to
disconnect individual users. None of these formal legal approaches are close to
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satisfactory, however, because illegal P2P file sharing is still rampant. 173 Because
major ISPs in mainland China are state-owned, the court may lower the amount of
damages. The government may be more apt to determine the disconnection issues.
The Korean approach might work in mainland China because administrative
protection has played a significant role in mainland China. Finally, this article
explored how the notice-and-notice procedures used in Hong Kong seem to be more
appealing than the graduated response system and provide optimism for future
procedural improvements.

173Xiaoqing Feng & Frank Xianfeng Huang, International Standards and Local Elements:
New Developments of Copyright Law in China, 49 J. COPYRIGHT SOCY U.S.A. 917, 940 (2002).

